Beyond the Border: A Sober Reflection on Major Madhan Kumar's Warning and the New Geography of Warfare
An essay prompted by the recent address of Major Madhan Kumar (Retd.), defence veteran and geopolitical analyst
Major Madhan Kumar (Retd.) — YouTube address
Watch the address in full on YouTube
Foreword
Between 2010 and 2012, I wrote from time to time on current affairs, defence and matters of national security. After an interval of several years, I find myself returning to that field of writing, prompted by a recent address by Major Madhan Kumar (Retd.). His observations regarding the changing reach of contemporary drone and missile warfare, and the consequent implications for India's interior, struck me as deserving of sober consideration and informed public discussion. This essay is my own reflection upon the concerns he has raised, examined in the light of developments in recent theatres of conflict.
The concern is deceptively simple. For generations, distance has been one of India's silent strategic assets. A conflict at the western frontier was, in the popular imagination, a matter principally concerning the frontier itself and the military establishments in its vicinity. The great cities of peninsular and central India, lying hundreds or even thousands of kilometres away, possessed the reassurance of geographical depth.
But what happens when the nature of the weapon changes?
What happens when an unmanned aircraft can travel immense distances, when such aircraft can be manufactured in large numbers, when they are comparatively inexpensive, and when they can be used in conjunction with cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, decoys and electronic warfare?
These are not questions intended to create alarm. Nor are they an indictment of India's air-defence capabilities. On the contrary, I have complete confidence in the competence of our armed forces and in the increasingly sophisticated defensive architecture built by India.
The question, rather, is whether confidence should ever be permitted to become complacency.
Operation SINDOOR: A Record Worth Respecting
Let me state my position without ambiguity. I have complete confidence in India's air-defence capability. Operation SINDOOR demonstrated why such confidence is justified.
During the night of 8–9 May 2025, the Government of India stated that Pakistani forces attempted drone intrusions at 36 locations along the International Border and Line of Control, from Leh to Sir Creek, employing approximately 300 to 400 drones. Indian forces brought down a number of those drones through kinetic and non-kinetic means. The Government further indicated that the scale of the intrusions appeared, among other things, to be an attempt to test Indian air-defence systems and gather intelligence.
That is a significant achievement, and it should be acknowledged without reservation. A country should have confidence in a defence establishment which is capable of confronting a substantial unmanned aerial intrusion and denying it the intended result.
Yet one must be careful about drawing a universal conclusion from a particular engagement.
A successful defence against the attack that occurred does not, by itself, prove that every future form of attack will possess the same character, scale or difficulty.
The Enemy Learns
There is another point which I believe deserves particular emphasis.
An enemy must never be taken lightly.
The people on the other side are human beings, as we are. They observe, study, analyse, improvise and learn. They examine their failures, seek explanations for them and attempt to devise better answers. India has done precisely the same throughout its military history. Every conflict teaches lessons. Every setback produces an enquiry. Every successful defence reveals something about the method employed against us.
Why, then, should we imagine that an adversary will remain permanently confined to the methods that failed yesterday?
Operation SINDOOR was a lesson to India. It was also a lesson to Pakistan. What was intercepted will be examined. What was detected will be studied. What failed will be modified. What proved effective will perhaps be reproduced in another form.
That is the very nature of warfare.
Turkey, Pakistan and the Lesson of Adaptation
There is, however, another development which merits attention, for it bears directly upon the proposition that an adversary ought never to be taken lightly.
During Operation SINDOOR in May 2025, Pakistan employed a considerable number of unmanned systems against Indian positions along the northern and western fronts. The Government of India stated on 9 May that approximately 300 to 400 drones had attempted intrusions at 36 locations extending from Leh to Sir Creek. Preliminary forensic examination of the debris indicated that a number of the drones were ASISGUARD Songar systems of Turkish origin.
Indian media subsequently reported, citing security sources, that Turkey had supplied Pakistan with a substantial number of drones and that Turkish personnel or operators had assisted Pakistani forces in the employment or coordination of these systems. Other reports similarly described Turkish participation in certain drone operations. Such reports ought properly to be treated as source-based reporting rather than as a publicly acknowledged Turkish admission.
The distinction is important. Nevertheless, the demonstrated presence of Turkish-origin unmanned systems in the Pakistani effort is itself significant, for it illustrates how readily modern military technology may pass from one theatre of conflict into another.
The employment of these systems did not produce the result that Pakistan would have desired. India's air-defence systems dealt with the drone and loitering-munition threat effectively. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the matter ended there.
An intelligent adversary does not ordinarily abandon a capability merely because its first employment proved unsuccessful. He examines the reasons for the failure, identifies deficiencies and seeks to rectify them. If a particular method of attack is defeated, another method may be sought. If a particular drone proves inadequate, a more capable platform may be procured. If quantity alone does not suffice, greater range, greater endurance, improved navigation, better sensors, electronic resilience or more sophisticated munitions may be introduced.
India has learnt in precisely the same manner. We have studied our own successes and failures; we have altered doctrine and methods after encountering difficulties; we have improved equipment; we have invested in indigenous technologies; and we have sought better systems whenever circumstances have required them. There is therefore little justification for imagining that an adversary will remain permanently at the level at which he was found yesterday.
Indeed, reports emerging after Operation SINDOOR indicated that Turkey and Pakistan were examining or revising arrangements involving further unmanned systems, including the Bayraktar TB2 and AKINCI, together with substantial numbers of loitering munitions. Such reports, being based upon sources rather than upon a publicly disclosed and fully detailed arrangement, ought to be approached with the caution appropriate to defence procurement reporting.
The matter is nevertheless worthy of attention because it illustrates a larger principle: a capability tested in one engagement may subsequently be enlarged, refined and employed in a different manner.
The significance of the Turkish–Pakistani relationship therefore lies not merely in the number of drones that may eventually enter Pakistan's inventory. It lies in the possibility of a continuing process of adaptation, acquisition and technological improvement.
The failure of yesterday's attack may become the starting point for tomorrow's improvement.
The Enemy Learns
There is another point which I believe deserves particular emphasis.
An enemy must never be taken lightly.
The people on the other side are human beings, as we are. They observe, study, analyse, improvise and learn. They examine their failures, seek explanations for them and attempt to devise better answers. India has done precisely the same throughout its military history. Every conflict teaches lessons. Every setback produces an enquiry. Every successful defence reveals something about the method employed against us.
Why, then, should we imagine that an adversary will remain permanently confined to the methods that failed yesterday?
Operation SINDOOR was a lesson to India. It was also a lesson to Pakistan. What was intercepted will be examined. What was detected will be studied. What failed will be modified. What proved effective will perhaps be reproduced in another form.
One example is particularly instructive. During the period surrounding Operation SINDOOR, Pakistan deployed Chinese-made SH-15 155 mm wheeled self-propelled howitzers in positions facing India. Pakistan had already contracted for these systems from China, with deliveries having commenced before the 2025 conflict; their deployment and subsequent emphasis therefore represent not a weapon suddenly supplied after SINDOOR, but an existing capability whose mobility assumed renewed significance during and after the confrontation. The SH-15 is a highly mobile artillery system designed to fire and relocate rapidly — the familiar “shoot-and-scoot” principle. Reports have specifically highlighted this mobility as an advantage in enabling Pakistani artillery formations to reduce their exposure to Indian counter-battery fire. [1]
The significance of such mobility is not difficult to appreciate. A conventional fixed artillery position is necessarily more vulnerable once its firing location has been established. Modern counter-battery radars can analyse the trajectory of an incoming artillery round and help determine the approximate point from which the weapon was fired. The sooner an artillery piece can fire, displace and establish itself at another location, the more difficult it becomes for the opposing force to bring effective retaliatory fire upon it.
The lesson is a simple one: once an adversary finds that a particular method exposes him to unacceptable risk, he will seek greater mobility, concealment, dispersion or survivability.
This is precisely the pattern that we must expect in the development of unmanned warfare as well. A drone formation which proves vulnerable may be altered. A launch method which is detected may be changed. A platform which lacks sufficient endurance may be replaced by one with greater range. Numbers may be increased; signatures may be reduced; navigation may be improved; electronic resilience may be strengthened.
India has learnt in precisely the same manner. We have studied our own successes and failures; we have altered doctrine and methods after encountering difficulties; we have improved equipment; we have invested in indigenous technologies; and we have sought better systems whenever circumstances have required them. There is therefore little justification for imagining that an adversary will remain permanently at the level at which he was found yesterday.
Indeed, this is perhaps the most important lesson that Operation SINDOOR ought to leave behind. The defeat of a particular weapon or tactic does not necessarily end the problem; it may instead compel the adversary to devise a better one.
That is the very nature of warfare.
The Economics and Arithmetic of Saturation
The rise of the inexpensive unmanned aircraft presents a problem which is not entirely technological. It is also economic.
A drone may be comparatively inexpensive, expendable and capable of being produced in quantity. An interceptor missile, by contrast, is a sophisticated and finite military asset. It embodies expensive components, specialised manufacturing, testing, storage, maintenance and logistics.
One must be cautious about assigning a single price to the drone, for military unmanned systems vary enormously in cost, from small improvised aircraft to sophisticated long-range platforms and loitering munitions. The important point is not the precise price of one drone. It is the asymmetry between expendable attacking mass and finite defensive inventory.
The question then ceases to be merely, “Can the drone be destroyed?”
The more important question becomes: “Can the defender continue to destroy the next hundred, and the hundred after those, while retaining sufficient resources for the more consequential missiles which may accompany or follow them?”
The object of a very large drone attack need not necessarily be the destruction of an air-defence system in the conventional sense. It may instead be to compel the defender to expend the resources with which that defence is maintained.
Every incoming system must be detected, tracked, assessed and, where necessary, engaged. The defender must decide which weapon is appropriate, preserve sufficient capacity to address other threats, maintain sensors and communications, replenish inventories and remain prepared for the possibility that the most dangerous weapon has not yet arrived.
Now imagine a mixed attack: unmanned aircraft in large numbers, some of them decoys, some carrying warheads, others intended to complicate the defensive picture, followed by or accompanied by cruise missiles or ballistic missiles.
It would be incorrect to declare that any air-defence network would inevitably collapse under such circumstances. Modern layered air defence exists precisely to prevent such an outcome.
It would be equally unwise, however, to assume that any defensive architecture possesses an unlimited supply of sensors, engagement channels, interceptors, reloads and time.
The problem is therefore not necessarily one of failure. It is a question of capacity.
Israel and the Arithmetic of Saturation
The confrontation between Israel and Iran in June 2026 provides a useful illustration of this distinction.
Israel possesses one of the most sophisticated layered air-defence arrangements in the world. Systems such as Arrow, David's Sling and Iron Dome are integrated with extensive surveillance, command-and-control, intelligence and allied support. Yet even such a formidable architecture operates in the real world of finite inventories and finite time.
The Israeli Ministry of Defence subsequently reported that approximately 86 per cent of ballistic missiles launched from Iran towards Israeli territory were intercepted, together with an exceptionally high interception rate against unmanned aerial vehicles.
These figures are a tribute to Israeli technological and operational capability. They should not be misrepresented as a failure.
They nevertheless illustrate a simple mathematical proposition: when the incoming number becomes sufficiently large, even a small percentage of penetration ceases to be numerically insignificant.
The purpose of this observation is not to suggest that a particular interception percentage will remain constant in a future conflict. Nor does missile defence reduce to a simple percentage calculation. Detection, trajectory, redundancy, weapon type, engagement geometry and many other variables are involved.
The broader point remains sound: mass changes the arithmetic of defence.
Ukraine Has Changed the Meaning of Distance
If Israel teaches us something about the arithmetic of mass, the war in Ukraine teaches us something about the changing value of distance.
Ukraine has developed long-range unmanned systems capable of reaching deep into Russian territory. In March 2025, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy publicly announced that a Ukrainian drone with a stated range of 3,000 kilometres had successfully completed testing. That statement should properly be described as an official Ukrainian claim concerning a tested capability, rather than treated as proof that every operational sortie will achieve that range.
Nevertheless, the broader proposition is no longer theoretical. Ukrainian long-range drone strikes have reached Russian targets more than a thousand kilometres from Ukrainian territory. The continuing development of such systems demonstrates that the traditional assumption that great distance alone places an interior target beyond meaningful aerial threat is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain.
What matters for the Indian discussion is not Russia's geography or Ukraine's particular war. What matters is the technological lesson.
Distance which once amounted to practical sanctuary is becoming increasingly penetrable.
The unmanned aircraft does not place a human pilot at risk. It may, in appropriate circumstances, be produced in substantial quantity. And because an unmanned platform may be comparatively inexpensive in relation to many traditional military systems, the attacker may be prepared to accept losses that would be unacceptable in manned aviation.
And the Technology Can Travel
There is a further consideration which deserves attention, though it must be stated with appropriate caution.
Technologies developed under the pressure of war do not necessarily remain confined to the battlefield on which they were born. Defence industries, suppliers, research institutions and military partnerships create channels through which knowledge and equipment may travel.
Recent reporting has suggested possible Ukrainian interest in cooperation with Pakistan concerning long-range unmanned systems. Other reports have discussed potential supply. At the present stage, prudence requires us to distinguish between a reported possibility, an offer, a prospective technology relationship and a confirmed operational transfer. These are not the same thing.
The strategic point, however, survives that distinction.
India cannot assume that a capability demonstrated in the Ukrainian theatre will remain indefinitely unique to that theatre.
Technology migrates. Experience migrates. Knowledge migrates.
A determined adversary will naturally seek whatever knowledge or equipment may improve his own military position.
What Major Madhan Kumar's Concern Means for India
This, to my mind, is the real significance of Major Madhan Kumar's warning.
The matter is not that one should wake up tomorrow expecting a missile over Madras, Bangalore or Hyderabad. That would be irresponsible speculation.
Nor is the suggestion that India's air defence is inadequate. The evidence of Operation SINDOOR points in the opposite direction.
The issue is that the strategic value of geographical depth may be diminishing.
For a long time, distance itself was a form of defence. An adversary seeking to attack the Indian interior required aircraft capable of travelling great distances, surviving air defences, delivering weapons and returning safely. The cost and complexity of such an operation created formidable barriers.
The drone alters that equation.
A relatively inexpensive unmanned system may be expendable. It may be possible to launch many of them. It may be possible to improve them by rapid iteration. And it may be possible to combine them with other systems so that the defender is required to answer not one problem but several at once.
This is why the question of India's interior cities merits discussion before, rather than after, the technology has become commonplace in our own neighbourhood.
A Layered Defence Requires a Layered Answer
There is a temptation, whenever a new threat appears, to ask for a single new weapon with which it may be defeated. Modern warfare does not generally permit such simplicity.
The answer to the proliferation of inexpensive unmanned aircraft is more likely to be a family of complementary capabilities: radar and electro-optical detection, electronic warfare, guns, short-range interceptors, counter-drone systems, fighter aircraft where appropriate, directed-energy systems as they mature, and higher-end missiles reserved for the threats against which they are actually required.
What matters is not merely the excellence of one weapon but the depth of the entire defensive architecture.
The objective should be to ensure that a cheap drone does not automatically oblige the defender to spend the most expensive available interceptor.
That is not a criticism of missile technology. It is a recognition that different threats require different economic and technological responses.
Preparedness Is Not Alarmism
There is sometimes a reluctance to discuss such matters in public because of the fear that citizens may become alarmed. That concern is understandable.
But the alternative cannot be silence.
A mature democracy should be capable of discussing defence preparedness without descending into panic. Equally, it should be capable of discussing vulnerabilities without allowing every such discussion to be interpreted as a declaration of weakness.
The purpose of examining the concerns raised by Major Madhan Kumar is therefore not to undermine confidence in India but to ensure that confidence is accompanied by foresight.
Not Fear, but Preparedness
The subject with which I began this essay is therefore a rather simple one.
Can India's interior remain confident that the distances separating it from a hostile border will, by themselves, guarantee the degree of security upon which earlier generations could reasonably rely?
I do not think we should assume so.
That conclusion does not require us to doubt India's armed forces, nor does it require us to predict an attack upon any particular Indian city. It requires only that we recognise a basic truth of military affairs: the adversary learns, technology evolves, weapons become cheaper and more numerous, and the geography of warfare consequently changes.
India has learnt from its wars. We have altered our doctrine, strengthened our capabilities, improved our industry and developed new technologies. There is no reason to suppose that an adversary will behave otherwise.
We should therefore neither fear the enemy nor underestimate him.
Major Madhan Kumar's address, in my humble view, raises precisely this distinction.
The lesson of Operation SINDOOR is that India possesses formidable defensive capabilities. The lesson of Ukraine is that distance is becoming less protective. The lesson of Israel and Iran is that even exceptional defensive systems must operate within the arithmetic of finite inventories and sustained attacks. The lesson of the drone itself is that an inexpensive weapon, employed in quantity, may impose a disproportionately expensive burden upon the defender unless the defence possesses suitably layered and economical responses.
And the lesson of history is perhaps the simplest of all:
This essay is therefore not intended to induce disquiet among the reading public, nor to suggest that catastrophe is imminent.
It is intended to make the modest and defensible point that the character of aerial warfare has altered, and that the protective value once attributed to geographical distance may no longer be taken for granted.
India must continue to invest, innovate, produce, adapt and prepare.
Not because we doubt our strength. But because we respect the future.
And because, in matters of national security, it is far wiser to prepare for a possibility than to discover its consequences after the possibility has become a reality.
Not fear, but preparedness.
My humble opinion.
Did You Know?
Ukraine's stated 3,000-kilometre drone capability: On 17 March 2025, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated officially that a Ukrainian long-range drone with a stated range of 3,000 kilometres had successfully passed testing. This should be understood as an official Ukrainian statement about a tested capability, not as a guarantee that every operational sortie achieves that range.
Operation SINDOOR: India's Ministry of External Affairs reported approximately 300–400 drone intrusions attempted at 36 locations along the western frontier on the night of 8–9 May 2025.
Operation Rising Lion: Israel's Ministry of Defence later reported an 86-per-cent interception rate against Iranian ballistic missiles during the June 2025 operation.
Glossary
Air-defence architecture: The complete arrangement of sensors, command-and-control systems, weapons, communications, personnel and procedures employed to detect, identify, track and defeat hostile aircraft, missiles and unmanned systems. A modern air-defence architecture is normally composed of several complementary layers rather than a single weapon system.
Ballistic missile: A missile which, after its powered phase, follows a predominantly ballistic trajectory governed substantially by gravity and its initial velocity. Ballistic missiles may travel at very high speeds and present distinctive detection and interception problems compared with aircraft or conventional cruise missiles.
Counter-battery radar: A radar system designed to detect hostile artillery, rocket or mortar fire and, by analysing the trajectory of an incoming projectile, estimate the location from which it was fired. Such systems are an important element of modern counter-battery warfare.
Counter-UAS (C-UAS): Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems; the collection of technologies, equipment and procedures used to detect, identify, track, disrupt or defeat unmanned aircraft. Depending upon the system, this may include radar, electro-optical sensors, electronic warfare, guns, interceptor missiles and other means.
Cruise missile: A guided missile which generally flies through the atmosphere for most or all of its journey, often at relatively low altitude and with sustained aerodynamic flight. Unlike a ballistic missile, a cruise missile does not normally follow a predominantly ballistic trajectory.
Decoy: An object, signal or unmanned system intended to resemble, imitate or otherwise complicate the detection and identification of a genuine military target. Decoys may be employed to divert defensive resources, confuse sensors or obscure the identity of more valuable incoming weapons.
Directed-energy weapon: A system which employs concentrated electromagnetic energy, rather than a conventional projectile or explosive warhead, to damage, disable or defeat a target. High-energy lasers are an example of a directed-energy technology being investigated and developed for air-defence and counter-UAS applications.
Electronic warfare: The use of electromagnetic energy to protect one's own systems, disrupt or deceive an adversary's electronic systems, or exploit the electromagnetic environment. In the context of drone warfare, electronic warfare may be employed to interfere with communications, navigation or control links.
Engagement channel: The capacity of an air-defence system to deal with a particular number of targets simultaneously or within a given period. This depends upon sensors, command-and-control systems, available weapons and the characteristics of the defensive network.
Geographical depth: The physical distance between a nation's frontier or principal area of conflict and important centres, infrastructure and population centres in its interior. Historically, such distance could provide substantial protection against many forms of attack.
Geographical sanctuary: A term used in this essay to describe the protective value once provided by great physical distance from the immediate theatre of conflict. The argument of the essay is that increasingly long-range unmanned systems may reduce, though not necessarily eliminate, that protective value.
Interceptor: A defensive weapon intended to destroy or disable an incoming aircraft, missile, drone or other hostile object before it reaches its intended target. Interceptors vary greatly in size, range, speed, guidance method and cost.
Layered air defence: A defence architecture employing several complementary systems operating at different ranges and against different classes of threat. Such a structure may combine long-range, medium-range and short-range systems with guns, electronic warfare, surveillance and other counter-UAS measures.
Loitering munition: An unmanned weapon designed to remain airborne, or “loiter”, for a period while searching for or awaiting a suitable target before carrying out an attack. It combines characteristics of an unmanned aircraft with those of a guided munition.
Mass drone attack: The employment of a large number of unmanned aircraft in a coordinated or successive attack. A mass attack need not constitute a technically autonomous “swarm”; the term is therefore broader than swarm warfare.
Missile saturation: A condition in which the number, timing or variety of incoming missiles places exceptionally heavy demands upon the defender's sensors, engagement channels, interceptors, command-and-control network and available time.
Proliferation: The spread of a military technology, weapon, system or related expertise from one country, organisation or theatre of conflict to others. In contemporary warfare, developments in unmanned systems may spread through commercial, industrial or defence partnerships.
Resilience: The capacity of a military system or infrastructure to continue functioning despite disruption, damage, electronic interference, loss of individual components or repeated attack. Resilience is an important element of national air-defence planning.
Saturation attack: An attack employing such numbers, combinations or successive waves of weapons that the defender is placed under exceptional pressure in respect of detection, tracking, decision-making, engagement channels, interceptor stocks and time.
Shoot-and-scoot: A field-artillery operating principle in which a mobile artillery system fires a prescribed mission and then rapidly changes position before counter-battery fire can locate and engage it. Mobility therefore becomes an important part of the weapon's survivability.
Swarm: A term commonly used for the coordinated employment of numerous unmanned systems. In its stricter technical sense, a swarm may involve significant levels of networking, communication, cooperation or autonomous behaviour among the individual systems. A large number of drones operating independently is not necessarily a true autonomous swarm.
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS): The complete system associated with an unmanned aircraft, including the aircraft itself, its control equipment, communications links, operators and other supporting components.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV): An aircraft which operates without a human pilot physically aboard. The term is widely used for remotely operated or otherwise unmanned aircraft employed for reconnaissance, surveillance, communications, combat and other purposes.
Counter-battery warfare: The detection and engagement of an adversary's artillery, rocket or mortar systems, normally in response to hostile fire. Counter-battery operations depend heavily upon radar, acoustic, optical, electronic and other forms of detection and targeting.
Strategic depth: The extent to which a nation's geographical space, infrastructure, military dispositions and supporting resources provide room for absorbing, responding to or recovering from an attack. Strategic depth is broader than geographical distance alone.
References & Further Reading
- Primary address: Major Madhan Kumar (Retd.), defence veteran and geopolitical analyst, whose address occasioned this essay — Watch the address on YouTube .
- Government of India — Ministry of External Affairs: Special briefing concerning Operation SINDOOR, 9 May 2025, including the statement that approximately 300–400 drones attempted intrusions at 36 locations extending from Leh to Sir Creek — Ministry of External Affairs .
- Government of India — Operation SINDOOR and Turkish-origin systems: The Government of India's briefing concerning the examination of recovered drone components and the preliminary identification of Turkish-origin ASISGUARD Songar systems.
- India — Chief of Defence Staff, General Anil Chauhan: Public remarks concerning the performance of Indian air defence during Operation SINDOOR and the absence of damage to Indian military or civilian infrastructure from the Pakistani drones and loitering munitions employed during the operation.
- Office of the President of Ukraine: Statement of 17 March 2025 concerning successful testing of a Ukrainian long-range drone with a stated range of 3,000 kilometres. The statement is cited in this essay as an official Ukrainian claim concerning a tested capability and not as a guarantee of operational range on every sortie. President of Ukraine .
- Ukraine and long-range unmanned warfare: Contemporary reporting concerning Ukrainian drone strikes reaching deep into Russian territory and the continuing development of long-range unmanned systems.
- Israel Ministry of Defence: Assessment of the performance of advanced Israeli systems during Operation Rising Lion, including the reported interception rate against Iranian ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial systems. Israel Ministry of Defence .
- Turkey and Pakistan: Indian and international reporting concerning Turkish-origin unmanned systems employed by Pakistan during Operation SINDOOR, reported Turkish assistance, and subsequent reporting concerning further Turkey–Pakistan cooperation in unmanned systems. Such reporting should be read with the distinction between intelligence or source-based reports and publicly acknowledged official statements.
- Bayraktar AKINCI: Publicly available information concerning the Turkish unmanned combat aircraft and its reported operation by Pakistan. The reference is relevant to the essay's discussion of the progressive acquisition of more capable unmanned systems.
- Chinese SH-15 artillery system: Publicly available defence reporting concerning Pakistan's acquisition and employment of the Chinese-made SH-15 155 mm wheeled self-propelled howitzer, including its mobility and the associated “shoot-and-scoot” operating principle.
- Counter-battery warfare: General military literature concerning the use of counter-battery radar and associated sensor systems to identify the approximate point of origin of artillery fire through analysis of projectile trajectories.
- Counter-UAS and layered air defence: Publicly available technical and defence literature concerning the integration of radar, electro-optical sensors, electronic warfare, guns, missiles and other means for the detection and defeat of unmanned aircraft.
About the Author
I am Dhinakar Rajaram, a Chennai-based writer with long-standing interests in science, technology, astronomy, history, music and contemporary affairs. Between 2010 and 2012, I wrote periodically on current affairs, defence and matters of national interest. After a long interval, I have returned to the subject with this essay, prompted by the observations of Major Madhan Kumar (Retd.) and by the rapid changes taking place in the character of modern warfare.
I write as an independent civilian observer. I do not claim to speak on behalf of the Armed Forces, the Government of India, or any defence establishment. My purpose is simply to examine matters of public importance, consider the available evidence, and place my own observations before the reader in the hope that they may contribute, however modestly, to informed discussion.
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